RANGER AGAINST WAR: Uphill Battle I <

Tuesday, December 16, 2008

Uphill Battle I


Do you feel sick when you read it?

Do you think that I can feel it faster?

--Uphill Battle, Saosin

____________


Special Forces troops can always be counted on to kick ass and take names when the chips are down. But reading about the 10 SF troops who received Silver Stars Friday, Ranger asks: Why were the chips on the table in the first place?


Are U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan to kill insurgents or terrorists? Are we nation building or war fighting? History shows that the two are incompatible missions. There is a protocol: First, win the war. Later, build the nation. Building a nation while blowing its citizens to hell is not conducive to victory -- whatever that is.


Afghanistan is largely composed of Taliban-types, and killing them does not further the development of the nation. Killing all of the insurgents in Afghanistan would depopulate the country.


If al-Qaeda is the threat, then fighting Afghan insurgents is a red herring and a waste of precious assets. Al Qaeda is not Taliban. Obviously there are linkages, but the exportable threat is the enemy of the US. The Taliban does not export their brand of violence.


Some questions regarding the awarded action [in two parts]:


After jumping out of helicopters at daybreak onto jagged, ice-covered rocks and into water at an altitude of 10,000 feet, the 12-man Special Forces team scrambled up the steep mountainside toward its target -- an insurgent stronghold in northeast Afghanistan (Ten Green Berets to Receive Silver Star for Afghan Battle.)


Why would a combat assault be launched at daybreak, when locals are active and starting their day? Why not utilize the advantage of a night attack, enabled by U.S. night vision technological supremacy? Alternately, why not illuminate the area with indirect fire and fly in?


"Our plan," Capt. Kyle M. Walton recalled in an interview, "was to fight downhill."


If the plan was to fight downhill, why didn’t they? Landing in depressions and stream beds indicates one is not on a hilltop. These troops made the same error as in the engagement at Roberts Ridge and in Lt. Murphy’s Medal of Honor scenario.


A team should land above the enemy and attack downhill. This has been an Army rule since air-assaults were first conceived. Attacking up hills in denied terrain is not conducive to long life and prosperity. Nobody of sound mind lands in a beaten zone and then tries to fight uphill to attack prepared defensive positions.


This type of direct action mission is best assigned to Rangers or regular Infantry types. SF assets are too valuable to waste in close ground combat. Private soldiers are most cost-effectively used in this scenario. Deliberately using SF assets as assault troops is downright criminal and wasteful of valuable assets, especially if a long endless war is the Commander's vision.


A harrowing, nearly seven-hour battle unfolded on that mountainside in Afghanistan's Nuristan province on April 6, as Walton, his team and a few dozen Afghan commandos they had trained took fire from all directions. Outnumbered, the Green Berets fought on even after half of them were wounded -- four critically -- and managed to subdue an estimated 150 to 200 insurgents, according to interviews with several team members and official citations.


This is interesting. When attacking a prepared defensive position the old rule of thumb was 3-4 attackers for each entrenched enemy. This rule assumed an artillery prep and force multipliers, to include adjacent units and adequate reserve forces with depth to the battlefield.


Ranger wonders what forces were available as ready reaction to reinforce or exploit any successes. If these were not on call and ready to jump off, then this whole scenario was a meaningless shoot 'em up.


So why was a 12-man SF unit with green indig troops attacking using an inverted formula? The SF attacking force was outnumbered and tactically compromised from the jump. 200 insurgents versus about 36 U.S-led troops.


Conclusion: SF/Rangers/Seals are not impervious to hot steel and it's obvious that staff planners still do not understand SOF asset capabilities. Further, the SF team commander should recognize a mission impossible when it is still in the planning phase. Nobody short of Superman can fight with 60 to 80 lbs on their back; especially at an elevation of 10,000 feet.


Today, Walton and nine of his teammates from Operational Detachment Alpha 3336 of the 3rd Special Forces Group will receive the Silver Star for their heroism in that battle -- the highest number of such awards given to the elite troops for a single engagement since the Vietnam War.


This reference requires Ranger to tip his hat to old friend Paul Longgrear, of Lang Vei fame, the Vietnam engagement often called The Night of the Silver Stars. Now historians will have to determine which battle was more devastating. The roles were reversed, however, as the NVA lost the toss and were attacking; SF/Longgrear defending.


Both scenarios required SF troops to attempt the impossible-this is not what military actions are about. If a team does not have a reasonable chance to fulfill the mission, it should not be attempted.


Tomorrow: Part 2

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10 Comments:

Anonymous Anonymous said...

I have No Military back ground at all, but if the bad guys are on top of the mountain why wasn't air cover used? I agree as some one the doesn't know, who the hell fights going up a hill?
jo6pac
O approves of gates going forward with the A surge. Sad day

Tuesday, December 16, 2008 at 10:17:00 PM GMT-5  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

So what are you saying here Ranger? Was this bad planning or bad leadership or are they both the same? Bad training?

jo6pac I agree with the sad day scenario. I unsubscribed to the Dems and Plouffe's emails the other day citing their Afghan policy. Although alot of good that'll do but at least I won't have to read their personalized lies.

Tuesday, December 16, 2008 at 11:53:00 PM GMT-5  
Blogger rangeragainstwar said...

TW,
See part 2 for an answer.But truthfully it seems to be a combination of both.The SF have the training to know that this mission was pissing up a rope.

jo6
Yep-CHANGE??????????!!!!!
We as infantry have historically fought offensively for hills and usually center our defenses around hilly terrain. It's as old as mankind.Helos were supposed to bypass this need.Oh well... jim

Wednesday, December 17, 2008 at 10:40:00 AM GMT-5  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

Well, Ranger, I agree with you, and even I wrote a critique of the operation.
Namely questioning the overall, "uh...what?"
I cleaned it, dressed it, put some lipstick on the article, and then let one of my friends read it.
Uh-boy.
He says, "you're fucking kidding me! you're fucking joking right? Those are American soldiers, green berets, best of the best! How dare you question their patriotism!"
I blinked...um...looked at the article, handed back to him with a red pen, and said, "you circle where I questioned their patriotism and I will line it out, and sing Sadlers ode as a paen to their mighty greatness."
He shook his head, and left me with the article.
Apparently, writing a critique about how our special forces are used, the tactics employed, and questioning the intelligence of their commanding officers, as well as the intel (wth? The whole village opened up on them...that should say something about "intelligence failure.").
Anyway, I read it again, thought about it, tore it up, deleted it off my computer, and marked it up as I'm too old to argue anymore.

Wednesday, December 17, 2008 at 6:54:00 PM GMT-5  
Blogger rangeragainstwar said...

sheerahkhan,

I had to stand up because you stood down -- for shame! If the best of the best even take the time to interact by writing, and then "delete," what does that say about the status of discourse today?

In the future, vet it with Ranger Hruska. We will share a co-write.

Only an idiot could view this as anything but stupidity.

Wednesday, December 17, 2008 at 7:25:00 PM GMT-5  
Blogger FDChief said...

I wish that SOCOM had jumped you to three-star back in the 1990's, Jim. We might be reading less about SF teams refighting the battle of Monte Cassino now.

I never "got" the point behind moving the SF into the direct-action business. Not because there isn't room for another elite DA unit, but because moving them OUT of unconventional warfare (IMO just a fancy term for "training with the native auxiliaries", an Army task as old as the Apache and Philippine Scouts) left a huge hole in our low-intensity war capabilities you pointed out in your "Mike Force" post a week ago.

Bottom line is, there should not even be more than a couple of hundred foreign troopers on the ground in the 'Stan by now. These guys are some of the most savage irregular warriors on the planet. If you're telling me you can't make a army from "our" Afghans that can't make a Khyber-knife ocarina out of any Islamic fundamentalist north of the Hindu Kush you're telling me that there's something wrong, not with how we're doing it but with what we're trying to do in the land of the Pathan. The entire Afghan mission shouldn't have taken more than a couple of SF Groups plus a handful of attachments. Wasn't the original notion that an ODA provided the cadre for a company- to battalion-sized indig force? So figure one to two Afghan brigades per SF company, and a division per Group. ISTM that 40,000 locals, thoroughly trained and armed and familiar with the local terrain and peoples, should have been able to do a pretty damn good job on whatever Pakistani holdouts they faced.

But that's just me...

Wednesday, December 17, 2008 at 10:10:00 PM GMT-5  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

Jim - Great post.  I first read of this operation on another military site frequented by young active duty soldiers and Marines.  As with the other operation I mentioned to you privately, the uniform response to this one was basically praise for our heroic guys and lets go get some pay back right away now!  No analysis whatsoever of the mission and tactics involved.  I really wonder if military training has been dumbed down (by intent or accident?) since your time...GSJ  

Wednesday, December 17, 2008 at 10:21:00 PM GMT-5  
Blogger rangeragainstwar said...

FDChief,

Thanks for the compliment, but I couldn't get promoted b/c I'm not a bible-thumper.

It is obvious that 500 of their fighters = 5,000 of ours. It is not contructive to put an upper or lower number on what SF can do in a UW environment.

The Jedburghs had small teams that worked with large numbers of guerrilla forces. The numbers just depend upon the situation.

I've never heard a hard fast rule re. what an ODA could achieve, at least not in my time. Lawrence of Arabia is a good example of the lower end. The problem with Afghanistan, Iraq and VN is, we're expecting people to die for money and our beliefs rather than their interests and beliefs.

Our Afghans will fight if it is within their interests to do so, and it's not. This is another block on what COIN can achieve.

Everything I say would be irrelevant if they'd had a realistic commander's guidance, per your recent series. But they don't, b/c their commanders lack experience.

Wednesday, December 17, 2008 at 10:39:00 PM GMT-5  
Blogger rangeragainstwar said...

GSJ,

It will be interesting to see how many of those young troopers will get to be my age.

The Capt. in this episode cannot accurately describe in military terms what happened. My Infantry Officer Adv. Course was 9-months, after we had company command. Today it is much truncated.

Wednesday, December 17, 2008 at 10:42:00 PM GMT-5  
Blogger rangeragainstwar said...

Follow-on:

This fight reminds me of the 2nd Ranger Bn. at Normandy. EXCEPT, there are no adjacent units, no reinforcements, inadequate artillery, no prep of the objective, inadequate number of troops to complete the mission. . .

But other than that, it was fairly similar.

Except the SF guys in Afghanistan didn't have ropes to assault climb. In fact, they were just pissing up a rope.

Wednesday, December 17, 2008 at 10:48:00 PM GMT-5  

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