RANGER AGAINST WAR: How Little Bighorn Looks like Afghanistan <

Wednesday, July 06, 2011

How Little Bighorn Looks like Afghanistan

Part of the Crazy Horse Memorial under construction
in the Black Hills of South Dakota, in Custer County

You can take an Afghan to Hell with kindness,
but never to heaven by force

--Afghan proverb


Tribe wars with tribe. Every man's hand

is against the other and all are against the stranger

... the state of continual tumult has produced

a habit of mind which holds life cheap

and embarks on war with careless levity

--Winston Churchill


Same old song

just a drop of water

in the endless sea

all we do

crumbles to the ground

though we refuse to see

--Dust in the Wind
, Kansas
_____________________

Chief advocates viewing the Battle of Little Bighorn as another fight in the progression of events which began in 1492. This perspective helps in understanding the totality of the situation. Using that viewpoint, let us extend lessons from LBH into current scenarios in Afghanistan dealing with Counterinsurgency, unconventional/guerrilla war (UW/GW) and terrorism. This may seem a stretch, but saddle up . . .

The hostiles in both scenarios did not have a problem in the world until the outer world forcibly imposed progress upon them. The Afghans have much experience repulsing the outsiders, be they Greek, Persian, British, Russian, Paki, Indian, Chinese, American or even present-day Iranians.

Minus external forces, the Native Americans and the Afghanis would do fine, thanks, without the education or whatever the interlopers wish to impose. Both nations (or more precisely, confederation of nations) would be happy to continue killing each other before it became necessary to reach out and kill The Other. The only thing better than killing each other would be to kill invaders.

Following are some ways LBH can be compared to the Phony War on Terror (PWOT):


[1] "Fighting Season" -- both the Indians and the Afghans could only fight when they could support themselves operationally. Where the Afghans gather support external to the group, the Indians had to follow the cycle of nature. Both groups were sidelined by deadly winter weather, but of course, they continued to train, plan, maintain equipment, etc.

[2] Militarily, both the Afghan and Indian War campaigns had the same goals. The hostiles were given a Hobson's choice: Submit to government control or pick up the lance. There is no discernable middle ground.

[3] The Afghan fighters have a force structure similar to that of the Indians, one based upon tribal loyalties and realities. The groups are usually as strong as their leaders. Both groups possess limited ability and opportunity to isolate the battlefield, but both have the luxury and will to prepare the field before they willingly engage government forces. Both are fighting for their survival as discrete entities; neither care to subsumed into their own loosely confederated nation nor into a construction fashioned by the invaders.

[4] Both must apply the concept of Mass and Economy of Force. The LBH demonstrated Mass as the prevailing principle, where most fights in Afghanistan demonstrate the principle of Economy of Force. The U.S. Army must gain and maintain contact with these adversaries, while it is the opposition's job to break contact until it is advantageous for them to turn and face the enemy. This was shown at LBH, Waygul and Wanat.

[5] Government forces used indigenous members to neutralize the indig. The government elevated the indig that they chose either to leadership positions or as judas goats. At LBH they were called Scouts and in Afghanistan they are called the Afghan National Army.

[6] Intelligence is mitigated: In 1876 intel was negligible to non-existent regarding the Indian's intentions. In Afghanistan there is so much intel that analysis is hampered. The reliability and validity in both cases is always in doubt.

[7] Concealment: In the Indian Wars, there was no place for the Indians; in Afghanistan, the hostiles hide in plain sight and there is no place for U.S. forces to hide.

In conclusion, the best hope of prevailing in the Afghan leg of the PWOT would be to use a tactic that worked with the Indians: Give them tax-free cigarettes, legal gambling casinos and tell them they are free and autonomous. Facts be damned.

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8 Comments:

Blogger Ghost Dansing said...

Geronimo's Cadillac

Thursday, July 7, 2011 at 5:08:00 PM GMT-5  
Anonymous William Ranger Hazen said...

Good Read. :)

Saturday, July 9, 2011 at 12:57:00 PM GMT-5  
Blogger rangeragainstwar said...

Ranger W.H.
The fights in Waygul and Wanat were as irresponsible as was the LBH.
US forces were set up for possible defeat in detail. All aspectsof these fights mirrored LBH and would've made Custer proud.
The Army IS STILL tryingto run on luck.
jim

Sunday, July 10, 2011 at 7:21:00 AM GMT-5  
Blogger rangeragainstwar said...

To:
jim@rangeragainstwar.com
Anonymous has left a new comment on your post "How Little Bighorn Looks like Afghanistan":

In your comparison lies the seed of a successful strategy for victory in Afghanistan (we will have to alter the ROE a wee bit).

Round up ALL indigs and put them on reservations. Kill any who resist or are discovered off the res.; this includes women and children. Burn their farms and kill off their livestock. Introduce them to cheap fire water; lots of it. Take away all copies of the Koran, forbid oral transmission of its contents and christianize them to the extent possible and via any means necessary. Make them totally dependent in every way on the gov't for even the most rudimentry necessities of survival. Manage the population with bio-warfare (infected blankets will work as well today as 150 years ago). Re-populate the Afghan countryside with US farmers of anglo-saxon descent (put those US farm subsidies to good use).

If we had started out this way - the right way to subordinate an ingrained incorigible unfriendly unruly heathen culture - ten years ago, we would be approaching victory within a generation, instead of staring at an uncertain timeline. The country and all the good stuff in it would be our childrens' to enjoy.

avedis

Tuesday, July 12, 2011 at 9:21:00 AM GMT-5  
Blogger rangeragainstwar said...

Avedis,
I ain't so dumm as to walk into this ambush.
jim

Tuesday, July 12, 2011 at 9:22:00 AM GMT-5  
Blogger rangeragainstwar said...

From:
"Anonymous"
Add sender to Contacts
To:
jim@rangeragainstwar.com
Anonymous has left a new comment on your post "How Little Bighorn Looks like Afghanistan":

Jim, oh now...nothing down this trail other than moonlight and crickets....

avedis

Sunday, July 17, 2011 at 10:09:00 AM GMT-5  
Blogger rangeragainstwar said...

Avedis,
You still aren't making it thru to blogger. Lisa will try to correct this.
As for the crickets- they'd end up biting me on the ass.
jim

Sunday, July 17, 2011 at 10:10:00 AM GMT-5  
Blogger Lisa said...

avedis,

Congrats on the new computer; I 'spect that'll make all the difference.

Monday, July 18, 2011 at 2:10:00 PM GMT-5  

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